IJN Admiral Takata
Admiral TAKATA discusses the Japanese efforts to reorganize their Naval
Air Force after the Battle of MIDWAY, the effects of the SOLOMONS
Campaign and of the Battle of the PHILIPPINE Sea. The planning for the
defense of the PHILIPPINES is considered, together with reasons for the
Japanese failure. In conclusion, Admiral TAKATA offers some general
comments on the origin and course of the PACIFIC War.
TRANSCRIPT
Q. What specific duties did you perform when you reported to the Staff
of the Combined Fleet in May 1943?
A. I was in charge of the general phase of the operation and was
promoted at the time of the death of Admiral YAMAMOTO and Admiral KOGA.
I was promoted to the position of Chief Staff Officer.
Q. When you reported to the Staff of the Third Fleet in July 1942, what
duties did you perform on that Staff?
A. After the MIDWAY Campaign, as you know, the First Air Fleet was very
heavily damaged and we had to reorganize the Third Fleet. I had the
mission to reorganize the Third Fleet.
Q. Approximately what percentage of the pilots were recovered after the
Battle of MIDWAY when your four carriers were sunk?
A. 30% of the pilots were killed and 40% were injured.
.............................................
Q. What do you think was the cause of the failure at MIDWAY?
A. The main reason of the failure was the strategical inefficiency on
the side of the Japanese Navy, careless mishandling of the Japanese
Navy. I think the chief reason for the failure was the lack of training
of the pilots in search. They also put too much emphasis on attack
tactics only.
Q. Which do you think was of greater importance, the failure to conduct
proper reconnaissance and obtain necessary tactical information on the
location of the American Forces or the better deployment or better
tactical operation of the American Forces in the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. I think that poor reconnaissance on the side of the Japanese was far
more the cause than the tactics.
...............................
Q. To get back to the air groups of the First Air Fleet that were
recovered after the Battle of MIDWAY, what disposition was made of these
air groups?
A. 30% of the pilots came back to JAPAN to convalesce, and 40% were
shifted to the Third Fleet, at KYUSHU, to go into further training.
Q. We have been told by certain people that some of them were sent to
the RABAUL Area. Is that correct?
A. The Third Fleet was organized on 15 July and they figured two months
were needed for their next operation; but before they had enough time to
reorganize, the GUADALCANAL picture came up and they were forced to send
these pilots prematurely to RABAUL.
Q. Do you remember what happened to the pilots in the RABAUL Area? What
happened to these well-trained pilots?
A. When they went down south, part of this original number of pilots
were sent to RABAUL carriers; but after the battle of SANTA CRUZ they
were brought back to JAPAN to be retrained and reorganized. However,
most of them were killed in action at PORT MORESBY, BUNA and SANTA CRUZ.
Q. During the period in late 1943 and early 1944, did you have other air
groups for the Third Fleet in training?
A. Anticipating island fighting, the Navy trained a new First Air Fleet,
different from the original First Fleet of the PEARL HARBOR attack, and
trained for land-based operations.
Q. At what time in early 1944 were these newly trained air groups
considered ready for operation?
A. The original plan was that they would be ready in May; that is, the
Third Fleet would have sufficient power by that time. However, the
American attack came earlier than expected so they were forced to go
south in an incomplete condition.
Q. Did the Japanese Navy consider that it had enough planes in late 1943
and 1944 to defend the islands south and east of TRUK?
A. They did not have enough planes and they were not so confident.
Interrogation Nav 64, Rear -- Admiral Toshitane Takata, USSBS NO. 258, (November 1, 1945). Interrogation of: Rear Admiral TAKATA, Toshitane,IJN; attached successively to the Staff of the Third Fleet, the Combined Fleet, and the Naval General Staff. Interrogated by: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN, Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr., USNR. Allied Officers Present: Col. R. Potts, USAAF.
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