Propaganda

Propaganda War Movies: For Freedom or Fear
by Irving Silverman
In WWII both Germany and the Allies used propaganda/war movies to help their war effort, but there were major differences in their respective approaches and uses.
While both sides believed they had a just cause for their fight in this war, when it came to trying to prove it with documentary films, the course of the war itself made it harder for Germany and easier for the Allies. The Germans used propaganda documentaries to show not only why they were fighting, but also why they expected to win the war. Their master race theory and the need to expand the nation controlled every event and every use of propaganda, especially in films.
The Allies, at first Britain, and then America, showed why they had to win the war. It was not good enough to show just the fighting. The important message was what would happen if the Allies did not win the war.
In Britain and America there was no one person in complete control of this industry. It was done through military/government agencies with individual directors who were given a certain amount of freedom to choose their topics. In America, the famous director Frank Capra was chosen to direct the most important series, "Why We Fight", to explain the war. In Germany, the Ministry of People's Enlightment and Propaganda chief, Dr. Joseph Goebbels, was in complete control; from assignments to editing and distribution. And when Goebbels wanted something done he usually got his way. There were very few people who could or would defy his orders.
In 1934, about one year after Adolf Hitler came to power, there was the first serious attempt to document Germany's renewal as an important nation in Europe and the world. "Triumph Of the Will" (1934) was directed by Leni Rienfenstahl and it showed how Hitler was preparing Germany for war. While it did not show the strength of the newly forming military, it did show how the people were enthralled by Hitler. But this movie was not under Goebbels' control. Riefenstahl, by 1934, had already become very famous in Germany and she was able to avoid Goebbels only because she had an even more important fan, Hitler. After some initial work for the Nazi Party, with Goebbels interfering in the operations, Riefenstahl "told Hitler of the obstacles she had encountered ... (and) he was angry over Goebbels' interferences and ordered her to make the film of the 1934 rally ..." and guaranteed her the independence that she wanted. This movie ended up being a classic in the field of propaganda. But Goebbels was determined never to let anyone else ever get the credit again.
Goebbels now made sure that everyone working in the media followed the Party's line, and that also included the film makers. Of whom many would end up using their talents to document the war with the help of Germany's technological advances in cameras, Leica; lenses, Carl Zeiss; and film, AGFA. With these improvements they would be able to film real scenes under harsh conditions and fluctuating lighting sources due to battle effects like smoke and fire. 'During the war the Propaganda Ministry employed over four hundred cameramen to maintain the image of a great and victorious German nation.' by making newsreels of what was happening. The ministry formed them into an organization; 'the Propaganda Companies to serve ... from the battlefronts. Film cameramen, reporters and commentators were mobilized into a general pool under military discipline ...' And according to Goebbels, they were both soldiers and cameramen, doing one job for the nation. 'Propaganda-Kompanien (PK for short). Teams of cameramen and journalists seconded to the armed forces. The PK's, armed ... were supposed to represent a "new kind of reporter" who, in Goebbels' words "Besides a pistol and a hand grenade ... carries other weapons: the film camera ..." ' And they suffered just like the rest of the military.
On the land, in the air, and on and under the seas these German cameramen followed the war. As Goebbels recorded in his diaries: 'In the evening I receive six cameramen from the Propaganda Companies, who have just returned from active service on all fronts. They have seen and done a lot, and are able to tell the most interesting stories." But while doing their double duty for their Fatherland they also had to endure double the risks. It was one thing to expose yourself for a brief moment in battle to try and kill your enemy; but to leave yourself vulnerable throughout most of a battle in order to get the best shot might get yourself shot instead. These cameramen had to be either very brave or very foolhardy, or very obeying of commands, but in any case they got the job done. They were totally involved in the fighting and there was 'no segregation for the war reporters ... and their casualties were heavy.' And some of them were rewarded for their actions. On October 23, 1939, after the invasion of Poland, Goebbels met ' with eight holders of the Iron Cross from the Propaganda Companies.' But even after all their efforts what they documented was not propaganda. The stock footage had to be selectively edited to make sure that only the proper images would be seen.
While Goebbels appreciated the propaganda capabilities of the various media; newspapers and radio, especially before the war, ' it was upon the film that Goebbels relied for his most effective propaganda. ... He realized how important it was to develop a strong newsreel, documentary and instructional film service ... .' Goebbels really enjoyed this part of his propaganda work. This was seen in his diaries in which hardly a day went by without a preview of the latest newsreel or film production. ' Goebbels previewed every issue of the newsreels that he could, and every major production of the feature studios. In addition ... , he viewed foreign films, particularly those which he had forbidden release in Germany. He saw every anti-Nazi film of which he could obtain a print. ... He looked at these films ... as good or bad examples of propaganda.' But it was with the newsreels that Goebbels saw real potential for propaganda. In fact, he ordered ' a few cameramen from the Propaganda Companies to be placed at my disposal. I shall use them for special tasks.' The special tasks were the continuation of thought control amongst the German people, especially the youth, and the people in occupied and soon to be occupied nations.
These newsreel clips were quite often compiled into documentary propaganda movies. One such film was "Baptism Of Fire"(1940). Here the film makers ' used the method of building up shots of conquest and destruction to paeans of Wagnerian music and sardonic commentary ... (that) mocks at Chamberlain for the futility of his decision to support the Poles ... .' To help make sure that Germany's message got through to foreign audiences, Goebbels arranged for these films to have ' prestige screenings at the German embassies in those countries which Germany hoped to bring under her power ... . The aim of these films was to impress rather than to inform, in fact to blackmail the audience into a bloodless surrender.' And they also went beyond future European victims. ' German agents, where ever they could, pressed them into distribution in the neutral countries (and) to Latin America for immediate release to neutral cinemas.' While in Germany this movie ' was shown simultaneously in 55 movie houses in Berlin and throughout the Reich. Mobile film vans took it to remote villages which lacked movie theaters.' The effort that Goebbels went through on the production and distribution of these movies was an indication of their importance.
But while the German authorities believed in the movies' importance, it was not always easy to get the message across to an audience. To get the impression across that these movies were important, Germany passed a law ' forbidding anyone from leaving or entering a theater during the showing of a war documentary.' This law was originally for German audiences, but it later was also applied to the audiences in occupied Europe. In these nations the Germans also had to deal with people who tried to interrupt the showings. ' These demonstrations ... grew to such proportions that the authorities ... were quick to insist that while newsreels were being projected some ... lights should remain ... on so that the agitators could be more easily identified.' The Germans had a good reason to try and show these movies. They were trying to prevent any hostile actions by the occupied peoples from occurring.
But it was not in occupied Europe where Germany focused the brunt of her propaganda. It was in Germany, for the ' mobilization and maintenance of fighting morale among both troops and civilian population.' But the Germans were not alone in the need to build up morale, the Allies needed to follow a similar idea also. ' Though of course the maintenance of wartime morale was an aim common to both systems, the task of the British propaganda apparatus was (built) upon the general acceptance of a just and necessary war in defense of existing values.' These values were a firm belief in democracy and religion. And these beliefs definitely applied to the Americans when they were forced to enter the war.
The Americans firmly believed that God was on the side of democracy. That even though Germany still had people who had a faith in God; God could not possibly condone their barbaric acts of war. But because of some strong disagreements over the war, the American government had to form a symbol, a rallying cause for the public. The need to fight to save democracy and show the enemy as the worst form of evil became that symbol. So when America went to war in WWII they fought because ' Americans adhere to honorable rules of conduct based in morality.' And their documentary propaganda/war films were made exactly for that reason. But here the Americans came across a similar problem that Germany had. How to make sure that the public was getting the message. In a democracy the government can not put a gun to a person's head and force them to watch and listen. Nor could they bribe the audience because there would still be no guarantee that the people would understand what they are supposed to be watching. So it became ' reasonable to suppose that unless that ... influence is repeated time and again it will have little if any permanent effect on the audience.' To assure this, a continuous series of movies would have to be made to make sure that the public would be exposed to the same message throughout the course of the war.
These types of movies were made to boost morale. The army had always worried about this problem and WWII was no exception. They tried various ways to instill the need to fight, but none seemed to work very well. After some American officials had seen "Triumph Of the Will", the idea that movies might do the trick became the next approach. Capra was given the job of answering the threats to freedom that the German movie showed. He knew that he needed one simple idea that every American could understand and he found it in the Bible. Just one sentence that could change the war. ' Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.' But Capra still wondered if it would and could work. He then realized that the actions of the enemy could prove he was right. ' Let the enemy prove to our soldiers the enormity of his cause - and the justness of ours.' These actions were recorded for posterity by the German newsreel makers and found in their propaganda movies. All Capra had to do was view thousands of feet of film and choose the best of the beastly scenes.
While at first these movies were made only for viewing by the military, the first movie in the "Why We Fight" series, "Prelude To War"(1942) was viewed by President Roosevelt who then stated that: ' Every man, woman, and child must see this film (and) that army chief of staff General George C. Marshall and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson were as eager ... for the general distribution of "Prelude To War".' There was a very wide scope to this film which covered much history. And this was purposely done to allow for scenes that were put in to reinforce the Christian moralities that America was fighting for. This was shown when the average American citizen, John Q., was shown to have the right to go to any church he wanted to. While this was a very patriotic movie it also summed up the answer to the series title. Anyone who had seen this movie had to now know "Why We Fight".
The answer was shown through the we and them; white and black; good and evil process. The good guys wore the white hat; loved and respected freedom while the enemy, the bad guys, wore the black hat and enslaved people. Capra even went so far as to dramatically illustrate this point at both the start and the end of the film. He used two animated globes revolving in space, one white, the other black. With both representing our world and what could happen to it. Which way would the world turn? To a black, evil life of repression or to the white, good life of Christianity. The answer would depend on the course of the war. This movie series emphasized America's historical attitude towards morality.
During WWII both Germany and America depended, to a certain degree, on documentary propaganda/war movies. While they both tried to maintain the morale of their nation, the German use of fear tactics to try and enforce their ideas just could not work forever. Once Germany began to lose the war it eventually became clear to most Germans that they were lied to by their government. By 1944 only the most die-hard Nazi could still believe Goebbels' propaganda. On the other hand, in America, it became easier because they were winning and the government did not have to cover up any big lie. So the major difference ended up being that truth wins out over lies when justice prevails.
Research:
Richard Meran Barsam, "Triumph Of the Will" (1975)
BBC TV: Art In the Third Reich - The Propaganda Machine (1989)
Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, "Doctor Goebbels"(1960)
Fred Taylor, "The Goebbels Diaries 1939-1941"(1982)
Anthony Rhodes, "Propaganda"(1976)
David Welch, "Nazi Propaganda"(1983)
Kathryn Kane, "Visions Of War"(1982)
Douglas Waples, "Print, Radio And Film In A Democracy"(1942)
Frank Capra,"Frank Capra: The Name Above the Title"(1971)
Bernard F. Dick, "The Star-Spangled Screen"(1985)

Waffen SS Muslim Divisions

SS Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler and SS Brigadefuhrer Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig during an inspection of Waffen SS Division Handschar -Handzar- aka. Scimitar, Sarajevo, 1943.
Perhaps the most notorious of the German Muslim divisions was the 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian). It was a Waffen-SS mountain infantry division. It was committed to the anti-partisan campaign in German occupied Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Croatia) during March-December 1944. This was a time in which the German military force was collapsing and the Red Army was entering the Balkans and the Allies landing in Normandy. The Division helped cover the German withdraw from Greece and the Balkans (September-December 1944). Croatia was a Fascist state and German-ally which declared its independence from Yugoslavia and included much of what is now Bosnia (after the Italian surrender) as well as part of Serbia. Handschar was a traditional combat knife or sword carried by Ottoman policemen who occupied the Balkans for several centuries. While the Whermact had begun using Muslims soon after the Barbarossa invasion (June 1941), the Handschar Division was the first non-Germanic Waffen-SS
division. Its formation marked the expansion of the Waffen-SS into a multi-ethnic military force, a sign of how desperate the race obsessed Germans had become. The SS recruited Bosnian Muslims (ethnic Bosniaks) and some Catholic Croats. German and Yugoslav Volksdeutsche (ethnic German) served as officers and non-commissioned officers. The men took an oath of allegiance to both Adolf Hitler and the Croatian leader Ante Pavelić.

Rhode Island-Center of Radio Interceptions During WWII.

About 70 years ago Rhode Islanders swarmed into the streets with other joyous Americans celebrating the end of World War II. It would be three more months before the world learned of Rhode Island’s top-secret role in defeating Germany and Japan.
It was a tale of espionage, now virtually forgotten, centered in, of all places, an old farmhouse in Scituate.
The clandestine mission that went on up there on Chopmist Hill from 1941 through 1945 not only helped defeat the enemy, historians say, but brought to Rhode Island the representatives of a new organization called the United Nations, looking for a headquarters location.
Incredible, perhaps. But true.
“They even had plans to build an airstrip if the United Nations ended up here,” says Scituate Town Historian Shirley Arnold. “Can you imagine that? In Scituate?”
No one knows the story anymore, she says. “All the old-timers are gone.”
There was nothing remarkable to see on Chopmist Hill in 1940 when, a year before the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and bring America into the war, a Boston radio technician by the name of Thomas B. Cave drove up Darby Road.
England was already at war with Germany, and Cave knew it was inevitable that the United States, already fortifying Great Britain with supplies and weaponry, would enter, too.
Cave worked for the Intelligence Division of the Federal Communications Commission, charged with finding a hilltop in southern New England that could serve as one of several listening posts to detect radio transmissions from German spies in the United States.
What he discovered up at William Suddard’s 183-acre farm was nothing short of miraculous.
Because of some geographic and atmospheric anomalies, Cave reported he could clearly intercept radio transmissions coming from Europe — even South America.
As a Providence Journal story revealed after the war, military officials were initially skeptical. They wanted Cave to prove his remarkable claims that from Chopmist Hill he could pinpoint the location of any radio transmission in the country within 15 minutes.
The Army set up a test. Without telling the FCC, it began broadcasting a signal from the Pentagon. From atop the 730-foot hill in the rural corner of Scituate, it took Cave all of seven minutes to zero in on the signal’s origin.
In March 1941, the Suddards obligingly moved out of their 14-room farmhouse, leasing the property to the FCC.
Workers set off erecting scores of telephone poles across the properly, purposely sinking them deep to keep them below the tree line. They strung 85,000 feet of antenna wire — the equivalent of 16 miles — around the poles and wired it into the house.
They fenced off the perimeter, erected floodlights and established armed patrols to keep people out. They filled six rooms with banks of sensitive radio receivers, transmitters and directional finders.
Then the FCC turned loose a 40-member spy team of men and women to listen in on the world —although none of them knew the full extent of the information they were cultivating.
The interceptors kept tabs on more than 400 different enemy radio transmitting stations broadcasting on any given day. They ferreted out secret low-frequency transmissions hidden under the beams of commercial radio stations abroad.
Much of what they intercepted were coded messages that were then recorded and sent electronically to Washington’s “black chamber” for decoding.
Shaping the war
The Chopmist Hill listening post soon became the largest and most successful of a nationwide network of 13 similar installations. Its ability to eavesdrop on German radio transmissions in North Africa, for instance, was so precise that technicians could actually listen in on tank-to-tank communications within Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s infamous Afrika Korps.
The Germans’ battlefield strategy was then relayed to the British, who under Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery eventually defeated Rommel at El Alamein.
The Chopmist station is also credited with saving the Queen Mary, the pride of England’s maritime fleet, as it was about to sail with 14,000 troops from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Australia.
The station intercepted orders from Germany to the Nazi’s submarine wolf pack operating in the south Atlantic to sink the ship. The radio station alerted the British, who ordered the ship to change course.
Cave, who supervised the Chopmist Hill station, told The Journal in November 1945 that virtually all the wartime messages sent by German spies working in the United States were intercepted in Scituate.
Often, those German spies were allowed to continue operating so counterintelligence officers could run down their sources of information.
One of Scituate station’s most important jobs was to intercept German weather reports from Central Europe.
The reports, broadcast at a frequency undetectable in England, flowed easily across the Atlantic to Chopmist Hill. The information proved vital for British bombing raids over Germany.
Occasionally the station assisted in air and sea rescue operations. On one occasion a plane carrying actress Kay Francis got lost off the coast of Florida en route home from a USO tour. No other radio installation on the East Coast had picked up the pilot’s distress calls, but the Chopmist Hill station did, guiding the plane home safely.
In 1981, George Sterling, who had been the FCC commissioner during the war, told a Providence Journal reporter that he never understood why the United States was caught by surprise in the Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor since the Chopmist Hill listening station had for months been intercepting Japanese messages in the Pacific indicating an impending attack.
Once war broke out, the station thwarted Japanese attempts to bomb the United States using unmanned hot-air balloons laden with explosives. The Japanese had placed radio transmitters on the balloons to track them as they rode the jet stream across the Pacific in the hope they reached the West Coast of America. Many did, and the Scituate eavesdroppers heard the balloon signals. They relayed the information to Washington. U.S. fighter planes intercepted and destroyed the balloons.
Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945, a week after Hitler committed suicide in a bunker in Berlin. The Japanese agreed to surrender on Aug. 14, 1945, five days after the U.S. dropped a second atomic bomb, on Nagasaki.
UN takes a look
The remarkable radio capabilities of Chopmist Hill captured world attention after the war when, in November 1945, the FCC permitted a Providence Journal reporter to visit the monitoring station.
Two months after her story ran, seven inspectors from the United Nations Organization were climbing an icy fire lookout tower on Chopmist Hill and scanning the rural landscape below for what might become their new headquarters.
The Jan. 26, 1946, issue of The Providence Journal carried the lead headline: “Chopmist Hill District is rated One of Top Potential Locations for UNO Quarters by Committee.”
The story described how inspectors were seriously considering the site as its headquarters because of area’s unmatched capability to reach every corner of the globe by radio.
“This is a possible site,” Dr. Stoyan Gavrilovic, of the Balkans and chairman of the inspection committee, told reporters during the tour. “It meets most of the technical points. It is good.”
During the tour the inspectors went into a room in the Suddard farmhouse where on one bank of radio equipment signs hung listing the cities of Lisbon, Madrid and Cairo — the cities the radios were tuned to.
One of the inspectors asked Cave, directing the tour, what was the range of the radio station?
“Well, Sydney, Australia,” replied Cave. “That’s about the farthest place there is.”
The inspectors said they were also looking for a wide tract of land to build an airport as well as a headquarters. Cave said the site offered about 50 square miles of property spanning Scituate, Foster and Glocester that could be available, although about 1,000 people would have to be relocated.
The inspectors were in town for only a couple of days before heading off to inspect possible sites around Worcester and Boston.
In the end, the United Nations officials settled on New York City after John D. Rockefeller Jr. offered them $8.5 million to purchase a six-block tract of land along the East River.
Today the Suddard house still stands behind the same ornate stone wall it did more than 70 years ago. But the hill around it, once mostly pasture and scrub, is covered with tall trees and dotted with new homes.
The house, privately owned again, reveals few clues to what happened there the last time the world went to war, save for a tall, thin radio tower in the yard, now covered in ivy, reaching for the clouds.

For the Few

Spitfire Farm

Getting ready for D-Day

Boarding the landing craft in England for D-Day.

WWI night view of Artillery fire

Night time fire during WWI, 1917.

B-17G of the 91st Bomb Group limps home over the North Sea escorted by P-51 fighters.

B-17G of the 91st Bomb Group limps home over the North Sea escorted by P-51 fighters.

The man who made sure Israel was created by the UN -2 Gun Moishe (Cohen)

Morris Cohen in a Canadian regiment during World War One

 Morris Cohen, at the right in the white suit, with Chinese President Sun Yat-Sen.

 This picture of the upper echelon  showing Two-Gun Cohen, in the white suit, seated with President ChaingKai-Shek on his right, verifies his importance in Chinese leadership.
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 Cohen's gravestone in Manchester England.

Two Gun Cohen

Helped the Chinese fight against the Japanese in World War Two and tried to help the Nationalists against the Communists.

Morris “Two-Gun” Cohen was the one and only Jewish Chinese General and,
for a time, was head of the Chinese Secret Service! One of his colleagues was
Dr. Moses Schwarzberg, a Russian Jew who helped save China, for a time,
from the Communists.

The official languages in the Chinese Secret Service, because of the help by Cohen and Schwarzberg
during this time were Chinese, Yiddish and English.

Born in Poland to a large observant Jewish family of eight children, Abraham
Morris Cohen was a handful almost from the time he could walk. His father beat
him when he was three years old for wandering away from his East London home.
A sturdy lad, he responded to Christian boys’ bantering by – at age eight –
knocking out a 12-year-old. A boxing promoter signed him to fight professionally.
He called himself ”Fat Moisha” or “Cockney Cohen,” but would never enter the
ring on a Friday – the Jewish Sabbath. He feared his father’s wrath.

His family was poor and he earned pocket change by picking
pockets. Ultimately, he was recruited by a man known as “Harry the Gonof”
But he eventually was arrested. Then he was sent, at age 12, to a variety of reform schools. His angry
parents borrowed the money and sent him, aged 16, to a friend farming in Wappala,
then in the Assiniboia territory – later part of Saskatchewan.

Cohen’s life changed drastically one evening in Saskatoon and on
Sunday evenings, he enjoyed a large Chinese dinner and then gamble in the back
of the café. But, when he turned up one night at one of his favorite haunts, he
found the aged Chinese restaurant owner, Mah Sam, being held up by a hoodlum.

Cohen decided to take action and went up to the assailant and hit him hard in the head – disarmed him – and then threw him bodily
out of the restaurant.

This action opened up a relationship with the Chinese people. To the Chinese, he became a hero at a time when anti-Asiatic feeling in Canada
was even greater than its anti-Semitism. Cohen became the only white man
admitted to the ranks of the secret Chinese Tong.
Ultimately, Morris Cohen journeyed to China – now being led into modernity by
Dr. Sun Yat Sen, and he became commander of the President’s 250-man bodyguard.

Several attempts were made to assassinate Chinese President Sun Yat-Sen.
On one occasion, Cohen fought off three assailants attacking Sun on a train. He was nicked in his left hand.
The wound made him think. “Supposing it had been my right arm. As soon as we
got back to Canton, I got me a second gun, another Smith and Wesson revolver.”

Journalists dubbed him “Two-Gun” Cohen.

Two-Gun was of great service to the Chinese. A veteran of World War I, he taught
his new friends boxing and the use of weapons. He became a military adviser, and
an arms dealer. In 1922, he was named Director of the Chinese secret service.
Morris Cohen had a very limited knowledge of Chinese, but in his new post, he
was able to use Yiddish quite a bit. One of his confreres was interpreter -Doctor Moishe
Schwarzberg, and the two would chat in Yiddish!

The doctor had an urgent need to meet with President Sun and made his way to Shanghai but found his way to the President barred by
a highly-protective bodyguard. Schwartzberg gathered that the “huge man with a
shaved head and two pistols in his belt” was in charge but when he tried pleading
his case, in Chinese and Russian, the chief bodyguard responded, in English,
“Who the hell are you and what the hell do you want?”
When he learned who he was, Cohen switched to Yiddish. A collaboration of the
two Moishes was born. When Schartzberg made his presentation to Doctor Sun,
it became apparent that the Chinese President couldn’t read Russian. The
multilingual Jewish doctor was immediately offered a job as an interpreter.
Two-Gun put it this way: “Listen, kid, how would you like to stay on as Dr. Sun’s
confidential secretary. He likes you.” And so Chinese spies worked in Chinese,
Yiddish and English!

Cohen was named to command the Chinese 19th field army. Time Magazine,
in 1931, reported that Cohen “was named by the Canton government as a
Brigadier General.” He led Nationalist troops in fighting against both the
Japanese and communist Chinese.
When the Japanese entered World War II, in 1941, Cohen was captured in
Hong Kong. The Japanese now had a great enemy – but they didn’t know it.
By identifying himself as a Canadian businessman, he fooled the Japanese.

Ultimately, Morris Cohen was among a small number of prisoners released in
exchange for important Japanese officials held in the US. He returned to Canada.
“When we pulled into Montreal,” he said. “ I picked up my parcels and stepped
down on the platform – a free man.”
On Friday, Dec. 3rd, 1943, the Montreal Gazette reported “A few dozen men and
women met early yesterday at Bonaventure station for the sole purpose of meeting
the fairytale Chinese general, a Jew by birth a Canadian Citizen, Gen. Morrice
Cohen a former aide-de-camp to the famous rebuilder of China, Dr. Sun Yat sen.”

Cohen married a Montreal woman but the affair didn’t last. He planned to return
to England – but he had one great service to offer to the Jewish people.

In 1945, the United Nations was being formed in San Francisco. And a resolution
proposing the partitioning of Palestine into two states – one Jewish and the other
Arabic – was to be submitted to the new organization. The international Jewish
community was on hand to do what it could to see that the Resolution was passed.
Cohen flew to San Francisco and was able to convince the head of the Chinese delegation
to abstain from voting when he learned they planned to oppose partition. This happened because the Chinese delegate when he was in the Chinese Army was promoted to General by Cohen and they became friends. So as a friendly gesture to an old friend he agreed to Abstain China's vote in the UN. That
abstention ultimately helped ensure passage of the measure partitioning Palestine –
and allowing the creation of Israel.


He died in Manchester and was buried there with a trilingual headstone – in
English, traditional Hebrew and in Chinese as a tribute from the people he served
so well. The tribute identified him as “Mah Sam” – as close as the Chinese could
get to Morris Cohen. It means “clenched fist.”

Post war interview with IJN Admiral Takata

IJN Admiral Takata

Admiral TAKATA discusses the Japanese efforts to reorganize their Naval
Air Force after the Battle of MIDWAY, the effects of the SOLOMONS
Campaign and of the Battle of the PHILIPPINE Sea. The planning for the
defense of the PHILIPPINES is considered, together with reasons for the
Japanese failure. In conclusion, Admiral TAKATA offers some general
comments on the origin and course of the PACIFIC War.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What specific duties did you perform when you reported to the Staff
of the Combined Fleet in May 1943?
A. I was in charge of the general phase of the operation and was
promoted at the time of the death of Admiral YAMAMOTO and Admiral KOGA.
I was promoted to the position of Chief Staff Officer.

Q. When you reported to the Staff of the Third Fleet in July 1942, what
duties did you perform on that Staff?
A. After the MIDWAY Campaign, as you know, the First Air Fleet was very
heavily damaged and we had to reorganize the Third Fleet. I had the
mission to reorganize the Third Fleet.

Q. Approximately what percentage of the pilots were recovered after the
Battle of MIDWAY when your four carriers were sunk?
A. 30% of the pilots were killed and 40% were injured.

.............................................

Q. What do you think was the cause of the failure at MIDWAY?
A. The main reason of the failure was the strategical inefficiency on
the side of the Japanese Navy, careless mishandling of the Japanese
Navy. I think the chief reason for the failure was the lack of training
of the pilots in search. They also put too much emphasis on attack
tactics only.

Q. Which do you think was of greater importance, the failure to conduct
proper reconnaissance and obtain necessary tactical information on the
location of the American Forces or the better deployment or better
tactical operation of the American Forces in the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. I think that poor reconnaissance on the side of the Japanese was far
more the cause than the tactics.
...............................

Q. To get back to the air groups of the First Air Fleet that were
recovered after the Battle of MIDWAY, what disposition was made of these
air groups?
A. 30% of the pilots came back to JAPAN to convalesce, and 40% were
shifted to the Third Fleet, at KYUSHU, to go into further training.

Q. We have been told by certain people that some of them were sent to
the RABAUL Area. Is that correct?
A. The Third Fleet was organized on 15 July and they figured two months
were needed for their next operation; but before they had enough time to
reorganize, the GUADALCANAL picture came up and they were forced to send
these pilots prematurely to RABAUL.

Q. Do you remember what happened to the pilots in the RABAUL Area? What
happened to these well-trained pilots?
A. When they went down south, part of this original number of pilots
were sent to RABAUL carriers; but after the battle of SANTA CRUZ they
were brought back to JAPAN to be retrained and reorganized. However,
most of them were killed in action at PORT MORESBY, BUNA and SANTA CRUZ.

Q. During the period in late 1943 and early 1944, did you have other air
groups for the Third Fleet in training?
A. Anticipating island fighting, the Navy trained a new First Air Fleet,
different from the original First Fleet of the PEARL HARBOR attack, and
trained for land-based operations.

Q. At what time in early 1944 were these newly trained air groups
considered ready for operation?
A. The original plan was that they would be ready in May; that is, the
Third Fleet would have sufficient power by that time. However, the
American attack came earlier than expected so they were forced to go
south in an incomplete condition.

Q. Did the Japanese Navy consider that it had enough planes in late 1943
and 1944 to defend the islands south and east of TRUK?
A. They did not have enough planes and they were not so confident.

Interrogation Nav 64, Rear -- Admiral Toshitane Takata, USSBS NO. 258, (November 1, 1945). Interrogation of: Rear Admiral TAKATA, Toshitane,IJN; attached successively to the Staff of the Third Fleet, the Combined Fleet, and the Naval General Staff. Interrogated by: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN, Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr., USNR. Allied Officers Present: Col. R. Potts, USAAF.

Captured German equipment, 1917

Canadian officers inspecting captured guns near Vimy Ridge, 1917.

Blue Nosed Bastards of Bodney, of the 352nd Fighter Group, April, 1944

P-51 Blue Nosed Bastards of Bodney, of the 352nd Fighter Group, April, 1944.

B-29 gun controls images.

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Not All German Officers in WWII were NAZIs.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (Germany, 1887-1945)


Admiral Wilhelm Canaries was a World War I U-boat commander and war hero. He was appointed to head the Abwehr, German military intelligence (1935). He is one of the most mysterious figures of World War II. While a committed German patriot, he was horrified at SS atrocities in Poland that he personally witnessed. Other atrocities came to his attention such as plans to kill important Polish officials and nobles as well as highly educated and cultured Poles to destroy the Polish intelligentsia --the repository of national culture (Aktion AB). From that point he began to work to prevent a NAZI victory in the war. A great deal is known about his activities, but the full extent of his activities may never be known. He was extraordinarily effective, The NAZIs had no idea of his activities until the last months of the War. He was close to many top NAZIs like Goebbels who trusted him without reservation. Only after the Wehrmacht Bomb Plot (July 1944). Hitler had him hanged at Flossenburg Concentration Camp (April 9, 1945). Hitler had movies taken so he could watch. The Americans liberated the Camp (April 23). German military intelligence during World War II was highly ineffective. It is unclear just what Role Admiral Canaries played in this.
Parents

Wilhelm's father was Carl Canaries, a wealthy industrialist. His mother was Auguste Popp. The family for many years thought that they were related to the Greek admiral and freedom fighter Constantine Kanaris. This was a factor in the young Wilhelm's decision to pursue a naval career. He kept a portrait Kanaris in his office. Like many Germans in the 1930s, the family researched their ancestors and determined that the family came from northern Italy. The original family name was Canarisi. The family was found to have lived in Germany for several centuries (17th century). They were a Catholic family, but his grandfather converted from Catholicism to Lutheranism.
Childhood

Wilhelm was born on New Years Day in Aplerbeck (1887). this was a town near Dortmund, in Westphalia.
Education

Wilhelm was a good student with a flare for languages. He eventually learned five foreign languages (including English, French, Spanish, and two others). Despite his privileged family background and obvious intelligence, Wilhelm decided not to pursue a university education.
Naval Career

Canaries at age 17 enlisted in the Imperial German Navy (1905).
World War I (1914-18)

Canaries at the outbreak of World War I was serving on SMS Dresden as the intelligence officer. The Dresden was one of the few German vessels on the high seas when the British Royal Navy blockaded the North Sea. The Dresden participated in the Battle of Coronel off Chile (November 1914). Superior German use of radio intercepts was a major factor in the German victory. The Dresden was the only German vessel to survive the subsequent Battle of the Falklands (December 1914). The crews of the sunk vessels did not survive in the bitter cold waters of the South Pacific and South Atlantic. Canaries' clever deception techniques were a major factor allowing Dresden to evade intensive Royal Navy search patrols. The British finally found Dresden in Cumberland Bay. The Germans scuttled Dresden. The crew was interned in Chile (March 1915). Canaries managed to escape, in part because he was fluent in Spanish (August 1915). German merchants in Chile helped him get back to Germany. The Germany Navy gave him an intelligence assignment in Spain. The British attempted to kill him there. He was given command of a U-boat which eventually sank eighteen ships. He ended the War as a celebrated U-boat commander and war hero. His U-boat was in the Mediterranean when the War ended.
Family

Canaries married Erika Waag (1919). She was also from a wealthy industrialist family. They had two daughters (Eva and Brigitte).
Weimar Years (1919-33)

Canaries served in the ultra-nationalist and anti-Communist Freikorps after the War. He was close to Horst von Pflugk-Hartung. Pflugk-Hartung and others were accused of assassinating left-wing politicians. Several left-wing leaders, including Rosa Luxembourg were shot. Canaries was accused of being involved in the assassinations, but eventually exonerated. He managed to get an appointment to the Reichsmarine. It was very restricted by the Versailles Treaty. He was rose rapidly in rank. He became a Captain (1931). He was the Executive Officer of the cruiser Berlin and next the Commanding Officer of the battleship Schlesien. He also was involved in intelligence work. He strongly anti-Communist and got involved in right-wing politics. He was involved in meetings with military leaders, politicians and industrialists seeking to end the political turmoil in Germany. Canaries in the years just before Hitler seized power was deeply involved in right-wing politics, although not a NAZI Party member.
The Abwehr (1866-1944)

The Abwehr was the Prussian Army's intelligence arm. It was created as war with Austria loomed (1866). Success in the Austro-Prussian War and the subsequent Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) resulted in expanding the organization. Wilhelm Stieber oversaw the Abwehr which collected valuable information on French defenses wand was seen as playing an important role in the Prussian/German victory. One outcome of the War was the unification of Germany around the Prussian state. Thus many Prussian institutions became part of Imperial Germany. The Abwehr became the military intelligence organization of the new Imperial German military. The Abwehr collected valuable information that proved useful when the Germany Army invaded Belgium. Walther Nicolai oversaw the modernization of the Abwehr to accommodate new technologies. The Abwehr ran intelligence and sabotage operations in foreign countries, including the United States during the War. the Abwehr was forced to cease operation after World War I as part of terms of the Versailles Treaty (1919). The German military reactivated an intelligence service (1921). The military intelligence operations included surveillance of political parties. And this included the NAZIs even after they became the governing party (1933). The NAZIs set up their own independent intelligence service--Sicherheitsdienst (SD--Security Service). It was headed by SS officer Reinhard Heydrich. (A cashiered former naval officer.)
German World War II Spying and Counterintelligence

The major German spy achievement may have been before the War in encouraging Stalin's purge of the Red Amy. German intelligence during the War was nothing short of a disaster. The Soviets manage to surprise the Germans with a series of offensives beginning with offensive before Moscow. The Soviet offensive before Mosow was in fact the turning point of the War. The German failure to pick up on Soviet preprations was in part because of effective Soviet camafloge techniques. It also was both a failure of German intelligence and the mindset crated by Hitler in the Wehrmacht. Information on almost all of the German offensives leaked out, although neith ther the Sovirts or the Allies took advantage of this. Of course the German intelligence operation was the fact that the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, was actively working against the NAZIS. The major surprise German operation of the War was the Ardennes offensive which Allied intelligence failed to pick up on (December 1944). While German intelligence was a general failure, the German were very sucessful in tracking down resistance cells trying to send information back to London or get down flyers back to England.
Command of the Abwehr (1935-44)

Canaries was appointed to head the Abwehr, German military intelligence (1935). Thus he was the main German spy master during almost all of World war II. After being appointed to head the Abwehr, he negotiated with SD Director Heydrich over an agreed division of responsibilities. Both as World War II approached trained and maintained their own intelligence forces. Canaries set about reorganizing the Abwehr into three separate branches: 1) espionage, 2) counter-espionage, and 3) sabotage. He appointed three respected Abwehr agents to head the three different branches. He insisted that they could not be NAZI Party members.
Spain (1936)

Admiral Canaris spoke Spanish and had extensive contacts with the Soanish military. He surely was the German military officer with the greatest knowkledge of Spain at the time Francisco Franco launched his rebellion in Morocco (July 1936). Canaris knew many of the conservative officers involved in the revolt. Some authors even believe that he helped inpire the rebellion becaise of his aversion to the left-wing drift iof the Republic. Some sources maintain that Canaris persuaded Adolf Hitler to support Franco and the rebel forces who launched the Spanish Civil War (1936). The historical record is not clear. Hitler took the decesion which was critical in getting Franco's forces from Morocco to Spain. Hitler made the deesion at Bayreuth where Göring and Blomberg were present. Historians differe as to whether Canaris was present. [Whealey, p. 97.] There is no doubt that Canaris strongly supported the decesion and was active in the German military support team that aided Franco. German and Italian aid would prove decisive in Franco's victory.
Stalin's Purge of the Red Army

The Popular Leningrad leader Sergi Kirov was murdered (1934). Most historians believe that Stalin was probably responsible, but no actual evidence exists. Kirov was one of Stalin's important associates as he seized control of the Party. The two were very close. Kirov gradually came to question Stalin's methods. Stalin Subsequently launced massive purges of Soviet society--the Great Purges (1936). Eventually Stalin and his principal instrument, the NKVD, go around to the Red Army (1937). Stalin ordered the arrest of General Mikhail Tukhachevsky (May 22, 1937). He and seven other senior Red Army commanders were charged with organizing a "right-wing-Trotskyist" military conspiracy and spying for NAZI Germany. The arrests were reportedlu based on confessions obtained from other arrested officers. Of course in the Soviet system this meant that these officers were simply tortured until they confessed to what Stalin wanted them to say. Some Western historians until the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), insusted that the case against the Red Army generals was based on forged documents planted by Admiral Canaris' Abwehr in an effort to weaken the Red army. It was argued that the Abwehr documents convinced Stalin that Tukhachevsky was orcestrating a Red Army plot to depose him. Following the disolution of the Soviet Union, Soviet archieves were partially opened to Western researchers. Most historians now believe that Stalin from the beggining concocted an entirely fictitious plot as [part of his wider program of purges. He chose the best known and most respected of his generals-- Tukhachevsky. And the charges of treason were used to eliminate him and others in a believable manner. [Lukes, p. 95.] There was a German connection. Stalin's ordered NKVD agent Nikolai Skoblin to pass information to Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD) intelligence unit fabricated information proving that Tukhachevsky and the other Soviet generals were plotting to depose Stalin. (Heydrich was earlier involved with forging documents in the Night of the Long Knives operation.) Heydrich saw an opprtunity to not only weaken the Red Army, but also undermine his rival, Admiral Canaris. He ordered that documents be forged implicating Tukhachevsky and other Red Army commanders. As a result of the Rapollo Accords, many Red army commanders had contacts with Wehrmacgt officers. These documents were passed to the Soviets through Czech President Beneš and other neutral parties. Stalin's archives were found to include some of these documents which puport to show a connection between Tukhachevsky and the NAZI leadership. Heydrich and other NAZIs were convinced that they had tricked Stalin into executing his best generals. It now appears that they had simply aided Stalin in pusuing the purge that he had concoted on his own. Of course it could be that they did help convince Stalin that there were in reality traitors working against him./ It is difficult to know just what was happening in the depths of Stalin's mind. Unlike many other important officials tried as part of the purges, Tukhachevsky and other top generals were not tried in public. The court martial to the extent it actually occurred was conducted in secret (June 11). The German documents apparently were not used, but rather confessions extracted through torture or extortion (threats asgainst the family) was the principal evidence. Tukhachevsky and his fellow officers were shot immediately after the court martial. [Rayfield, p. 324.] While the German role appears to have been minimal. The impact on the Red Army was not. The execution of Tukhachevsky and his colleagues was just the beginning. A massive purge of the Red Army followed which eliminated many of the most competent and experienced commanders and officers. This undoubtedly was a factor in the poor perfornmance of the Red Army at the onset of Barbarossa.
Czechoslovakia (1938-39)

Admiral Canaries was involved in efforts to dissuade Hitler from invading Czechoslovakia. It is unclear hat his motives were. Some Wehrmacht officers attempting to discourage Hitler, not so much for moral reasons, but because they did not believe Germany was strong enough to prevail in another European war. Canaris at this time certainly saw the Soviet Union as Germany's major adversary and understood that invading Czechoslovakia was an absolute violation of the Munich agreenment and make any future cooperation with Britain and France impossible. We do not know just what arguments he present to Hitler.
Poland (1939)

Admiral Canaries was horrified at SS atrocities in Poland that he personally witnessed. He traveled to the front to watch Wehrmacht operations (September 10). At Bedzin, he watched SS troops drive 200 Jews into a synagogue and then set it on fire. The Jews all burned to death. Admiral Canaries was shocked. Other atrocities came to his attention in the reports he received from his intelligence officers. He also learned of plans to kill important Polish officials and nobles as well as highly educated and cutured Poles to destroy the Polish intelligencia--the repository of national culture (Aktion AB). He was unaware that Hitler had personally set the SS killing machine in operation. He went to Hitler’s headquarters train, the Amerika, which was in Upper Silesia (September 12). He met with General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. He told Keitel, “I have information that mass executions are being planned in Poland and that members of the Polish nobility and the clergy have been singled out for extermination. The world will one day hold the Wehrmacht responsible for these methods since these things are taking place under its nose.” Keitel was more of aware of Hitler's involvement and urged Canaries to take the matter no further. If he had, he probably would have been removed from command of the Abwehr. From that point he began to work to prevent a NAZI victory in the war. A great deal is known about his activities, but the full extent of his activities may never be known.
German Patriotism

He is one of the most mysterious figures of World War II. Canaris was a committed German patriot and fervent abnti-Communist. As World War II developed, Canaris began workihg against his own Government. His actions were directed toward the Western Allies. He continued to hope that the Germany could defeat the Soviets or at least prevent a Soviet occupation of Germany. Historians provide a range of view on Canaris. One author insists that after the Polish campaign, Canaris worked in many ways to prevent Hitler from winning the war, which he believed would be a disaster. [Johnson] Canaris probably had a greater impact on undermining the German war effort than all the other German anti-NAZIs combined.
Britain (1940)

Canaris exaggerated British strength in meetings with Hitler which helped to dissuade Hitler from launching Operation Sealion.
Spain (1940)

Admiral Canaries' most effective coup was probably in Spain. He had worked with Generalissimo Franco during the Spanish Civil war. Both Hitler and Mussolini had aided Franco. The two men had developed a close reputation. Canaries personally went to Spain and met with Franco after the Fall of France (1940). The Germans at the time were considering an attack on Gibraltar through Spain. Canaries advised Franco not to allow German troops to pass through Spanish territory. Canaries reasoned correctly that while Hitler might commit a force capable of seizing Gibraltar, he was so involved with plans for Barbarossa (the invasion of the Soviet Union) that he would not divert the resources needed to invade Spain. Hitler subsequently met with Franco at Hendaye on the French side of the Spanish border. He tried to get Franco to enter the War, both so he could attack Gibraltar and to get Spanish support for Barbarossa. Franco refused and the meeting became heated. Hitler expecting a more cooperative Franco was incensed. He said afterwards that he would rather have teeth pulled. Canaris essentially undermined NAZI diplomacy and Germany was unable to activate Operation Felix. . The consequences are incalcuable. Had Hitler brought Spain into the War, the Gernmans could have surely taken Gibraltar and Malta would have been untenable. And the British ability to interdict Axis supply routes to the Italian and subsequent German forces in North Africa almost surely would have enabled the Afrika Korps to seize Suez and opened the way to the Iraqi oil fields.
Holocaust

Canaris was horrified by the Holocaust. There he was little he could do to stop. Any open opposition would have resulted in his immediate removal and possible arrest. He did, however, managed to save several hundered Jews. More importantly, his action undermining the NAZI-war effort probanly save hundres of thousands if not the millions of European Jews that survived the Holocaust.
Tunisia (1943)

Canaris managed to prevent the execution of captured French officers in Tunisia.
Italy (1943)

Cabnaris misled Hitler into believing that the Allies would not land at Anzio.
Hiding His Activities

He was extraordinarily effective, The NAZIs had no idea of his activities until the last months of the War. He was close to many top NAZIs like Goebbels who trusted him without reservation. Goebbels reported meetings with Canaries in his diary. One entry read, "I had a long talk with Admiral Carais concerning the reprehensible attitude if a number of OKW and OKH officers. In his opinion one of the chief reasons is because the Seehaus Service [foreign broadcast transcripts] is being distributed so widely among officers and officials. I had a list of subscribers furnished me from which it appears that the Seehaus Service has become a veritable fountainhead of defeatism." [July 25, 1942-- Goebbels, p. 48.]
Bomb Plot Investigation

Suspicion as to Admiral Canaries' loyalty only began with the investigations following the Wehrmacht Bomb Plot (July 1944).
Execution

Hitler had him hanged at Flossenburg Concentration Camp (April 9, 1945). Hitler had movies taken so he could watch. The Americans liberated the Camp (April 23).
German Intelligence

German military intelligence during World War II was highly ineffective. It is unclear just what Role Admiral Canaries played in this.


Sources

Goebbels, Joseph. ed, Louis B. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Doubleday: New York, 1948), 566p.

Johnson, David Alan. Righteous Deception: German Officers Against Hitler.

Lukes, Igor. Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s (Oxford University Press, 1996).

Rayfield, Donald. Stalin and His Hangmen: The tyrant and Those who Killed for Him (New York: Random House, 2004).

Whealey, Robert H. Hitler and Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939.




https://www.histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/bio/c/bio-canaris.html

List of French Equipment Captured by Germany in 1940

The German army made extensive use of French captured vehicles and converted ex-French vehicles, though many had been retired by 1944, or had gone to axis allies such as Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy or Romania.

UE 630(f) Schlepper (about 3000 Renault UE have been used)

• Infanterie UE-Schlepper (f)
• Mannschaftstransportwagen Renault UE(f) (2 different versions)
• Kleiner Funk- und Beobachtungspanzer auf Infanterie-Schlepper UE (f) (40 produced)
• Fernmeldekabel Kraftwagen Renault UE(f)
• Selbstfahrlafette für 3.7cm Pak36 auf Renault UE(f) (700 pieces)
• Selbstfahrlafette für 28/32cm Wurfrahmen auf Infanterie-Schlepper UE (f) 
  (2 versions,  40 produced)
• Gepanzerte-MG-Träger Renault UE(f)
• Munitionsschlepper Renault UE(f)
• Sicherungsfahrzeug UE(f) – Luftwaffe security vehicles armed with 7.92mm and/or 13mm MGs
• Panzerkampfwagen Attrape auf UE(f) (dummy tank for training)
• Schneeschleuder auf Renault UE(f) (50 converted in snow ploughs in 1942)
• Schneefräser auf Renault UE(f) (snow milling) Lorraine 37L(f) Schlepper
• Gefechtsfeld-Versorgungsfahrzeug Lorraine 37L (f)
• Großer Funk- & Beobachtungspanzer Lorraine (f) (30 produced)
• 4.7cm Pak181(f) auf Geschützwagen Lorraine 
  (this is a French production in fact, not a German  conversion)
• Munitionstransportkraftwagen auf Lorraine Schlepper
• 7.5cm Pak40/1 auf Geschützwagen Lorraine "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• 10.5cm leFH18 auf Geschützwagen Lorraine (24 produced), 
  Wespe-equivalent based on Lorraine 37L
• 12.2cm Kanone (r) auf Geschützwagen Lorraine (f) (1 produced)
• 15cm sFH13/1 auf Geschützwagen Lorraine (102 produced), Hummel-equivalent based on
  Lorraine  37L Lorraine 38L(f) (SPW) Somua MCL S303 (f)
• Zugkraftwagen Somua MCL S303 (f)
• In 1943, Somua MCL S303 (f) were converted to personnel carriers mSPW S303(f),
  equivalent of  the Sdkfz 251/1
• 8cm Reihenwerfer auf SPW Somua S303 (f), 20x 81mm Brandt mortars on a single mount 
  (16  produced)
• 8cm Vielfachwerfer auf SPW Somua S303 (f), mounting 2 racks of 80mm rockets (6 produced)
• SPW S303(f) (Pionier), equivalent of the Sdkfz 251/7 Somua MCG S307 (f)
• Zugkraftwagen Somua MCG S307 (f)
• Munitions-Zugkraftwagen Somua MCG S307 (f) (48 produced)
• In 1943, Somua MCG S307 (f) were converted to mSPW S307(f), equivalent of the Sdkfz 251/1
• In 1943, Somua MCG S307 (f) were converted to pioneer Panzerwagen mSPW S307(f), 
  equivalent  of the Sdkfz 251/7
• In 1943, 72 Somua MCG S307 (f) were converted to 7,5cm Pak40 (Sf) auf mSPW S307(f),
  equivalent of the Sdkfz 251/22
• 8cm Reihenwerfer auf SPW Somua S307 (f), 16x 81mm Brandt mortars on a single mount
  (36 produced)
• 8cm Vielfachwerfer auf SPW Somua S307 (f), mounting 2 racks of 80mm rockets
• 15cm Panzerwerfer 42 (Sf) auf mSPW Somua S307(f) Zugkraftwagen P302 U302(f)
   Zugkraftwagen Unic TU1 U305(f)
• Leichter Artillerieschlepper
• Bergefahrzeug (towing/reparation car)
• Fahrschulfahrzeug (driving school car), used by the 4. PzD in the Panzer Regiment 35.2
  Zugkraftwagen P107 U304(f) (Unic-Kégresse P107)
• Leichter Zugkraftwagen P107 U304(f) (to tow 3.7cm Pak36, 7.5cm Pak97/38, 7.5cm PaK40,
  10.5cm leFH18)
• Mittlerer Munitionskraftwagen (munition transporter)
• Leichter Mannschaftstransportwagen (with a wooden open-top compartment to transport troops)
• Bergefahrzeug (towing/reparation car)
• Leichter Schützenpanerwagen : in 1943/44, P107s were converted to personnel carriers le SPW
   U304(f). They were stripped of their superstructures and fitted with armored hulls that were almost
  like the SdKfz 251 series (20cm higher). Issued to armored units in France.
• leSPW U304(f) (Funk) - Equivalent of the Sdkfz 251/3 radio/command vehicles
• Selbstfahrlafette U304(f) with FlaK 38 – Unic P107 partially armored mounting the 20mm Flak 38
• Selbstfahrlafette leSPW U304(f) with FlaK 38 –armored P107 mounting the 20mm Flak 38 (72
  produced for the Schnelle Brigade West)
• Zugführerwagen leSPW U304(f) (PaK 36) - Equivalent of the Sdkfz 251/10, mounting the 37mm
  PaK 36
• Granatwerfer leSPW U304(f) (8cm GrW) - Equivalent of the Sdkfz 251/2, mounting the 8cm
  mortar
• Sanität leSPW U304(f) (8cm GrW) - Equivalent of the Sdkfz 251/8
• Nachrichtenkraftwagen
  Zugkraftwagen Ci/380(f) (Citroën-Kégresse P19)
  Gepanzerter Transportkraftwagen P380(f) (Panhard-Kégresse)
  Panzerspähwagen VM 701(f) (AMR-33)
  Panzerspähwagen ZT 702(f) (AMR-35)
• PSW ZT 702(f)
• some were rearmed with 2cm KwK 30 or KwK 38 L/55 guns
• 8cm Granatwerfer auf PSW AMR35(f)
  Panzerspähwagen Wh 201(f) (AMD Laffly 50AM)
  Panzerspähwagen Laf 202(f) (AMD Laffly 80AM)
  Panzerspähwagen 203(f) (AMD Panhard 165/175)
  Panzerspähwagen 204(f) (AMD Panhard 178)
• PSW 204(f)
• some were rearmed with 2cm KwK 30 or KwK 38 L/55 guns
• some were modified and rearmed with 5cm KwK L/42 guns
• some were converted to railway protection armored cars
• some were converted to command vehicles without turret
  Panzerkampfwagen AMC 738(f) (AMC-35)
  Panzerkampfwagen 17R/18R 730(f) (Renault FT 17/18)
  Panzerkampfwagen 730c (f) is the cannon version and 730m (f) is the MG version. Many were
  used  in armored trains or were given to the Luftwaffe as snow ploughs for airfields
  Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731(f) (Renault R35)
• Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731(f)
• Befehlspanzer 35R (f) with a MG34 (26 produced)
• Munitionspanzer 35R 731(f)
• Bergeschlepper 35R 731(f) (towing of vehicles)
• Zugkraftwagen 35R 731(f)
• 4.7cm Pak(t) auf PzKpfw 35R (f) (200 produced)
• 5.0cm Pak38 auf PzKpfw 35R (f) (prototype)
• Flammenwerferpanzer 35R (f)
• Mörserzugmittel 35R (f) (Artillerie-Schlepper)
• some were used in armored trains
  Panzerkampfwagen 40 R 736(f) (Renault R40) 3
  Panzerkampfwagen D1 732(f) (Renault D1)
  Panzerkampfwagen D2 733(f) (Renault D2)
• Panzerkampfwagen D2 733(f)
• number of turrets was sent to Croatia and mounted on armored trains
  Panzerkampfwagen 35H 734(f) (Hotchkiss H35)
• Panzerkampfwagen 35H 734(f)
• Munitionsschlepper 35H 734(f)
• 7.5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw 35H (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• Slf. für 28/32cm Wurfrahmen auf PzKpfw 35H(f)
• some were used in armored trains
• Artillerie Panzerbeobachtungswagen auf 35H 734(f)
  Panzerkampfwagen 38H 735(f) (Hotchkiss H39)
• Panzerkampfwagen 38H 735(f)
• 7.5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw 38H (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• Munitionsschlepper 38H 735(f)
• Großer Funk- & Befehlspanzer 38H 735(f) (24 produced)
• Artillerie Panzerbeobachtungswagen auf 38H 735(f)
• 10.5cm leFH18/4 auf Geschützwagen 38H (f) , Wespe-equivalent based on Hotchkiss H39 tank
• Slf. für 28/32cm Wurfrahmen auf PzKpfw 38H(f)
• Mörserzugmittel 38H (f) (Artillerie-Schlepper)
• some were used in armored trains
  Panzerkampfwagen FCM 737(f) (FCM 36)
• Panzerkampfwagen FCM 737(f)
• 7.5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw FCM (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• 10.5cm leFH16 auf Geschützwagen FCM (f) (48 produced)
  Panzerkampfwagen 35S 739(f) (Somua S35)
• Panzerkampfwagen 35S 739(f)
• Fahrschulpanzer 35S (f)
• Mörserzugmittel 35S (f) (Artillerie-Schlepper)
• Befehlspanzer 35S (f)
• Munitions-Schlepper 35S (f)
• Pak40 auf Somua 35S (f)
• some were used in armored trains, Germans used about 300 Somua S-35s under the name
  Panzerkampfwagen 35S 739(f). It was mainly used in anti-partisans warfare but was also issued
  for  example to Panzer Abteilung 211 in Finland in 1941.They could also by find as
  Fahrschulpanzer Somua 35S(f), as artillery towing vehicle and as protection in armored trains.
  Some 35S were modified with a German tank commander's copula.
  Panzerkampfwagen B2 740(f) (Renault B1bis)
  160 B2(f) tanks were used by the German army :
• Panzerkampfwagen B2 740(f)
• 10.5cm leFH18/3 auf Geschützwagen B2(f) (18 converted in 1942)
• Flammenwerferpanzer Renault B2 (f), retaining the turret-mounted 47mm, but with the hull-
  mounted 75mm replaced by a flamethrower (60 converted)
• Fahrschulpanzer B1 (f) (turretless) (regular B2(f) + Fahrschulpanzers = 82 tanks)
  19.4cm Kanone 485 (f) auf Selbstfahrlafette
  Panzerkampfwagen 3C 741(f) (FM2C)
  Panzerkampfwagen 770(f) (Renault YS)



In August 1940, Hitler already decided that in further enlargement of the Army, the possibility of a campaign against Soviet Russia had to be considered. By the time this campaign began in June 1941, 84 more divisions were created. Just before Barbarossa, 88 infantry divisions, 3 motorized infantry divisions and 1 Panzerdivision were largely equipped with French vehicles. Without the extensive booty from the western campaign of 1940, these units would have remained without weapons and vehicles. Motor vehicles in particular played an important role in the motorization the divisions. The 18.PzD was equipped with strictly stock French motor vehicles until the end of May 1941. Among the trucks, the 4.5-ton Citroën Type 45 attained a certain significance. The 1-ton Peugeot was also seen often. The same was true for the French halftrack (Somua MCL and MCG, Unic P107 etc.) towing vehicles, which were used as tractors in the Panzerjäger units, infantry gun companies and motorized artillery units.

Most of the motor vehicles (German, French or other booty trucks) massively used for various transports were not to have long lives under the rough conditions of the Eastern theatre of war. The progressive deterioration of the German army's motor vehicle situation already in the autumn of 1941 led to numerous use and new production of French trucks and also to the transformation of about 200 French tanks into towing vehicles/tractors (Renault and Hotchkiss Mörserzugmittel / Artillerie-Schlepper).

Captured French aircraft and on-board weapons were put to use within certain limits. The Luftwaffe made more frequent use of airdropped ammunition. Among others, the French 50kg splinter bombs in packages of four with the Ab 500 3 A airdrop container were used, and the small 1kg splinter bombs were also kept in production.

About 5148 Renault UE (model 1931) and UE2 (model 1937) has been built for the French army (according to François Vauvillier's "L'automobile sous l'uniforme"). The German army captured some 3000 UE tractors (of those many were damaged and were only used to provide spare parts I guess) and had them overhauled in an assembly plant at Paris (Issy-les-Moulineaux) under the direction of the M.A.N. company.

These tractors were used in different tasks :
• towing light infantry guns (leIG18) and 3.7cm Paks
• towing 5.0cm, 7.5cm and 7.62cm Paks as well as heavy infantry guns (sIG33)
• transporting position material and seated wounded
• self-propelled mount for installed 3.7cm Pak36 and 2.5cm Pak112/113(f)
• scout car with installed machine gun
• armored car for the protection of airfields
• ammunition carrier +/- trailer to arm gun positions
• 28/32cm rocket launcher
• for training, simulating dummy tanks
• artillery observation
....
A significant rebuilding was the Renault UE reconnaissance tank. By the Becker building staff, 24 tractors were equipped with an armored rear body in which radio equipment and observation personnel were housed. Several of these vehicles were used by the 21. PzD.
The Luftwaffe rebuilt UE tractors into genuine small tanks used for securing its airfields and bases. By installing machine guns behind shields and in armored balconies, small series of securing vehicles were created.  The French UE tractor is also used by the Luftwaffe for towing aircraft bombs. Large bombs were simply attached to chains and dragged over the ground. Sometimes transport sleds made of wood were also used to move the bombs. After the battle of France, the German troops recovered/repaired many French tanks
   About :
• 500 FT-17
• 800 R-35/40
• 600 H-35/39
• 50 FCM-36
• 160 B1bis (18 B2(f) with 10.5 cm howitzers, 60 B2 flammpanzer and 82 B2(f) tanks + turretless
   B2(f) Fahrschulpanzer)
• 297 Somua S-35 tanks

Beginning 1942 the Waffen-SS security forces received 250 FT-17, 30 R-35 and 60 Hotchkiss tanks. Several tanks were given to Germany allies like for example 40 Renault R35 to Bulgaria and other R35 tanks to Croatia. The Luftwaffe used 100 FT-17 (25 for the Luftgaukommando Holland, 30 for the Luftgaukommando Belgien und Nordfrankreich and 45 for the Luftgaukommando Westfrankreich). For example, on December 31, 1944, 350 Hotchkiss based tanks were still used by the German army, although mostly in police and school units.

Concerning the Somua S35, though blaming its small turret, the High Command recognizes it as one of the best contemporary tanks. Its main assets are speed, armor and excellent 47mm SA35 L/34 gun (better penetration than the 3.7cm KwK36 L/46.5 of the Panzer III). So the modifications made are minimal to suit it to German use : copula cropped down and equipped with a 2 lid hatch, and the frequent addition of a FuG 5 10 watts radio set. The 6 command version gets a frame antenna over the rear and the gun is now a wooden dummy. The only other known German variant is the driver training "Fahrschule" tank, with the front hull component and turret removed.

One can try a not exhaustive distribution of the Somua S35 tanks. In many units the tank troops were made up of a Somua S35 leading 4 Hotchkiss H39 (38H in the German designation).
At the end of 1940 and beginning of 1941, Pz.Rgt.201 and 202 were created in France (each with 2 Abteilungen of 3 light companies), as well as the Pz.Abt.301. This one will soon be renamed in March 1941 to become the second Abteilung of Pz.Rgt.202, as the first units of this name went to battle in Finland. The second phase of units' creation was in June 1941, in the wake of the 3rd wave of rising new Panzerdivisionen, and corresponding regiments were equipped with French AFVs. But the units were often reequipped with German or Czech tanks before going to the Russian front. To be more precise, the units are Pz.Rgt.201 (which went to 23.PzD in December 1941),

Pz.Rgt.202  The I.Abteilung was sent to Yugoslavia in September 1941, the II.Abteilung and III.Abteilung were issued to the 26.PzD), Pz.Rgt.203 (it fought as an independent unit as part of Army Group North from December 1941) and Pz.Rgt.204 (to 22.PzD). This wave included the independent zbv 12 (mainly an administrative unit), company Paris (it says it all) and Pz.Abt.212 (going to Crete, also with some German tanks), Pz.Abt.214 (to Norway) ; the Pz.Abt.217 was sent to Jersey and Guernesey but used only B2(f) (Renault B1bis). So, at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, French tanks (often Somua S35 as part of the inventory) were seen only in I.Abt./201 in Yugoslavia, II.Abt./202 in Finland and Abteilungen 212, 214, 217. That is if you do not take into account the independent companies and such smaller units scattered in the West. But the material of the units reequipped left out in France was not lost.

The 3rd phase happened during the 1942 spring when the Panzerdivisionen fighting in Russia were sent to France for refit (before the summer offensive in South Russia) and so were given French tanks (Hotchkiss and Somua) : they were in Pz.Rgt.1, 2, 7, 11, 25 and 36. But these tanks were not involved in fighting when the divisions returned to Russia as they had received new German tanks before the long journey. Some units were created in France at the same time and went to the fight, as was Pz.Kie.223 which later merged in 22.PzD in Crimea, where it found use for its Somua S35s around Sevastopol in the spring of 1942.

The last phase was the creation of a unit destined to regroup the groups that housed French tanks in OB West in October 1942, Panzer Brigade 100 (which will quickly become Pz.Rgt.100). The Abteilungen going to this regiment were naturally the ones using French tanks in France, grossly Pz.Kie.81, 100 and 223. This regiment will eventually be involved in the rebuilding of the 21.PzD in July 1943 in France and will eventually be renamed Pz.Rgt.22 on 20th May 1944.

A major evolution occurred in October 1943 when the material captured in September from the former Italian ally begin to reequip the units fighting the partisan in the Balkans : Z.b.V 12, Pz.Abt.202 (lost near Beograd in 1944, it had initially 2 Somua S35 in HQ and 3 in 1st company) and SS Pz.Abt.7 'Prinz Eugen'. The last units with French tanks were created in November 1943. Pz.Abt.205 was deployed in the North of France and became anti-tank Abteilung in December 1944 (it had before that 10 Somua S35s : 2 in HQ and 4 in the 1st and 2nd companies). Pz.Abt.206 fought against the US forces in June 1944 in the Cotentin Peninsula (it had 10 Somua S35s : 2 in HQ and 4 in the 1st and 2nd companies) and was lost in Cherbourg. Pz.Ersatz Abt.100, created in April 1941 to train the crews on French tanks, went through all the reorganizations but met its fate in Normandy fighting along the 91.ID (it still had one Somua S35 on 19th May 1944).

Photos exist of Somua S35s in use in the following units : SS Gebirgsdivision 'Nord' in Norway 1943 and SS Division Totenkopf (France 1940). Among the units appearing in reports, there is Panzer-Jäger Abt.657 created in 1943 in the Netherlands, equipped with at least 2 Somua S35s.
The Somua went to 21.PzD which was rebuilt in France in July 1943 after its destruction in Tunisia. On 1st June 1944 the division had still 40 Somua S35s mainly in Pz.Rgt.22, 3 of them in Panzer Nachrichten Kompanie 200 (signal company). No more Somua S35s were recorded in the 1st September reports of this division, but it does not mean they were all destroyed in Normandy, as they were probably given to other units as they were considered as unfit for combat at the time.

As an anti-partisan weapon, the Somua S35 also went naturally to armoured trains. It was transported on railways cars with movable ramps to disembark rapidly and fight the 'saboteurs', or on 'Om' or 'SSk' Köln cars (with no possibility to leave them quickly). Two of these tanks were found on each train on the E. Panzer Züge 25 (replaced in 1943 by Pz38(t) tanks), 29, 30 and 31. The Panzer Züge 26, 27 and 28 got 3 Somua S35s each.

About 72 Somua S35s were released to German allies. Hungary got 2, Bulgaria 6 and Italy 32. The Royal Italian Army requested 50 to equip an experimental mixed company scheduled for Africa. It would have had an armoured car platoon, one equipped with Renault R35s and an other with Somua S35s, but not enough deliveries were made and only the armoured cars went to the front. The Somuas, sent without any spare parts, found their way to Sardinia where the battalion was disbanded without seeing any fight.

About 124 Renault R35 and 32 Somua S35 and maybe a couple of turretless Renault B2(f) tanks were given to Italy by Germany since February 1941 (a few Renault FT-17 tanks captured after the occupation of France in November 1942 were also used as targets in the Ciriè proving ground).
Only 3 tanks battalions were equipped with them :
• CI/131° and CII/131° (3 companies each) using Renault R35; they were in Sicily since December 1941 and took part to the defense of the island in July 1943 being completely destroyed.
• CC (two companies) using Somua S35 tanks was in Sardinia since December 1941; its tanks were used again by French troops after the Italian armistice of 8 September 1943.

A most interesting re-use of the Somua. The Toto's partisans captured a running S35 an rearmed it with a British 6-Pdr gun. The long recoil course obliged them to make up a prominent shield, giving the tank a unique profile.

Concerning the Renault B1bis, the first units equipped with B2 flame tanks were the 7th companies of Pz.Rgt.201 and 202, which were regrouped in 1941 in Pz.Abt.102 and engaged on the eastern front. Char B2(f) and B2(f) flame tanks were used during Barbarossa to reduce and destroy Russian fortifications in the summer of 1941. Pz.Abt.213 was later equipped with B2 tanks and stationed in French islands in the Channel.

Pz.Abt.206 was formed in November 1941 at Satory (near Paris), this battalion was used as a reserve unit for the 7.Armee. Wedged in Cherbourg, this unit was destroyed there. Its composition in beginning 1944 included 2 companies of 10 Hotchkiss H39 and 4 Somua S35s (in each company) and one "Stab Kompanie" of 3 Renault B2, 3 Renault B2 flamethrower, 2 Somua S35 and 2 Renault R35. Many such small units were formed with French booty/converted tanks like the Pz.Abt.100 committed to 91.ID in Normandy in 1944 (1 Somua S35, 8 Hotchkiss H39, 14 Renault R35, 1 Flammenwerferpanzer Renault B2, 1 PzIII and 5 FT17c) and the 21. Pz.D. included many French tanks.

Pz.Abt.223 was formed (attached to 22.PzD) with Char B2 flame tanks and was engaged in battles near Sevastopol in 1942. This unit was then expanded to include 2 panzer companies and command elements with a second company composed of 5 B2 and 12 B2 (Fl = flamethrower).
Different other units were also equipped with B2(f) tanks : Pz.Abt.224 in the Netherlands (engaged in Arnhem and Oosterbeek in 1944), two companies of the Pz.Rgt.100 in France and one company of 17 B2 from SS Pz.Abt.7 (SS 'Prinz Eugen' division) in the Balkans. In February 1945, 40 B2(f) tanks were still in service in the German army. Late war B2(f) had sometimes a kind of Zimmerit/concrete on their armor, at least on the turret. The B2(f) Flammpanzer could fire about 200x 2-3 seconds "napalm" shots.

Yugoslavia had been overrun in 11 days in April 1941. The 6 Panzerdivisionen that took part were redirected to the eastern front and the invasion of Russia. The remaining occupation forces in Yugoslavia had not many tanks. Despite the very mountainous area, tanks could be useful to escort convoys, provide fire support to garrisons as well as fight against partisans in search and destroy operations. In 1941, the Italian occupation troops had about 250 AFVs but these were very vulnerable and poorly armed CV33/L3 tankettes. On their side the German troops had only a few Renault FT17 tanks from former Yugoslavian army.

During summer 1941 the situation changed and the Germans sent the I.Abteilung of the Pz.Rgt.202 with about 60 French tanks to take up the role of armored support for anti-partisan forces in the Balkans. There were 3 combat companies (51 tanks), each with with one company HQ (2 Somua S35s) and 3 platoons (1 Somua S35 (platoon commander) and 4 Hotchkiss H39). On 18th September 1941, it was deployed to Serbia with 342.ID. These operations lasted until the middle of December 1941 and I.Abt./ Pz.Rgt.202 provided armored support to both 342.ID and 113.ID as well as to 704.ID, 714.ID, 717.ID and 718.ID when required. The unit served in the Balkans from January to March 1943 and was also with 22nd Mountain Corps. It is deployed in Hungary in March 1944 and transferred back to the Balkans by May 1944. At one point served under 12th Army (Wehrmacht Command South-East) Armeeoberkommando 12, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List.
Panzer-Kompanie Z.b.V 12 was also created to be administratively in charge of 5 independent platoons with 5 Renault R35s each in Yugoslavia.

On the Italian side very few L6/40 tanks and AB-41 armored cars were sent to Yugoslavia but also mainly AFVs from the 1920's and 1930's, including Lancia 1ZM armoured cars and L5 tanks (Italian copies of the French Renault FT17). The main Italian AFVs remained the L3 tankettes. Around 1943 several Autoprotetto 37 and Fiat 665NM Scudato armoured trucks were also sent as well as two SMV da75/18 and a few M13/40 in Slovenia.

During 1941-1943 the Germans deployed also other tank units :
• SS Pz.Abt.7 with the SS division 'Prinz Eugen' : 17 Renault B2 and B2(Fl) with also several Hotchkiss H39 tanks. The Renault B1bis is then the most powerful tank in Yugoslavia.
• Polizei-Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 18 including 20 Renault R35 tanks and 12 Steyr ADGZ armored cars (moves to Finland in December 1942)
• 6. Polizei-Panzer-Kompanie with 6 Steyr ADGZ armored cars and 5 Hotchkiss tanks
• 11. Polizei-Panzer-Kompanie with 6 Panhard 178 armored cars and 5 Hotchkiss tanks
• 13. Verstärkte Polizei-Panzer-Kompanie with 6 Steyr ADGZ armored cars, 6 Panzer II Ausf.J (VK1601, front armor of 50-80mm, only 22 produced but initially rejected by the army), 4 Panzer IV Ausf.F1 and 2 Sd.Kfz.251/16 (flamethrower).

After the Italian armistice the Germans seized many Italian equipments. During 1944, the 14., 15. and 16.Polizei-Panzer-Kompanie are equipped with Italian vehicles. The 373.(kroat.)ID eceived also 10 L6/40 tanks and 2 Autoprotetto in its Panzerjäger Abteilung. During 1944, the Pz.Abt.202 replaces its last French tanks by new Italian ones : 67 M15-42 (improved M13-40) but 70% of them are quickly not operational due to the cold weather.

The divisions SS 'Prinz Eugen', SS 'Handschar' and SS 'Skanderbeg' had one or two Hotchkiss H35/39 and Renault R35 companies, mostly in their Aufklärung Abteilung beside motorcycle and horse mounted men. The SS Kama division was later issued with the French tanks of the SS Handschar divisions in fall 1944. There were also Hotchkiss H39s in the Pz.Abt.200 during the Belgrad battle in October 1944.

According to Otto Kumm ("Vorwärts Prinz Eugen !") and completed by German and Yugoslavian archives, the 105. SS-StuG Abt from captain Paletta attacked on 11th October 1944 a T34 battalion progressing with the 36th Tito's partisans division, in front of Obrenovac (south-west of Belgrad). The dozen StuGs from SS Prinz Eugen are supported by French H-39 and R-35 tanks from Pz.Abt.200 and SS Aufklärung Abt. 21 from Kampfgruppe Skanderbeg. They destroyed 13 T34/85 and about 100 other miscellaneous vehicles. This counter-attack was launched to cover the retreat of elements from Armee-Gruppen E and F across the Save. Then the Renault and Hotchkiss tanks protected the retreat of the StuGs. By the end of the day the H39s and R35s are hardly attacked by IL-2 Sturmoviks.

The Hotchkiss, Somua and Renault French tanks were really liked in the Balkans because of their small size which allowed them to operate in the mountain areas, on the small trails and "roads" there and to provide close fire support to the engaged infantry units. There was also a huge stockpile of spare parts in the Renault and Hotchkiss factories in France.

To these tanks you have to add all the other vehicles : motorcycles, sidecars, cars, trucks, armored cars and the numerous conversions based on French chassis and realized by the Germans. French captured tanks and armored cars were first use on the Eastern front. Several new units were first trained on French tanks like 24.PzD and 25.PzD formed respectively in France (November 1941) and Norway (February 1942) with French tanks before being converted to German ones when sent to the front. These tanks were nevertheless not only used for training or anti-partisans warfare, for example the Pz.Abt.211 in Finland destroyed 24 Russian tanks and 5 AT guns between 4-8th July 1941 in Salla, North Finland. This unit was equipped with H39 and S35 tanks (Source : Kari Kuusela – "Wehrmachtin Panssarit Suomessa/Panzers In Finland").

The Germans were not long to realize the usefulness in combat of the Panhard P178. Seen as technically rated over the average armored cars, notably over the SdKfz 222 series, they were immediately put back to service during the campaign of France with German crosses.
About 190 P178 armored cars were used unmodified in 1941 with 107 lost in action on the Eastern front during following years. At the beginning of Barbarossa, beside Waffen-SS units such as "Totenkopf" or "Das Reich" and police units, the PSW-204(f) was mainly found in the 37th (7.PzD) and 92nd (20.PzD) armored reconnaissance battalions. 64 vehicles in the 37th (10 more than in theory) and 54 vehicles in the 92th with generally 18 radio variants. The Panhard 178 was the vehicle that went the closer to Moscow, they reached the terminal bus station.

In the secondary security tasks several exemplars were put on railway cars in armored trains (such as Panzerzug 25) to protect the lines. Later 43 were transformed in true "draisine", mostly to operate on rail-roads against partisans in the Balkans. After the invasion of the "Free Zone" in November 1942 more Panhard P178s had been captured, most of these were twin-MG variants. There were also an undetermined number of P178s fitted with the CDM turret (version with the 47mm SA35 gun) found in hidden depots. At least 2 were used in the Sicherung Aufklärungsabteilung 1000 (affiliated to 89.ID). They fought against partisans in Auvergne. The 1st Army for example still had 10 Panhard P178 on 30th December 1944 on the Western front.

Command Panhard P178s with a casemate instead of a turret and two radios were also captured in France, some kept their former role but most were given to PK (Propaganda Kompanie) units, often issued to war correspondents of the Waffen-SS ("Das Reich" and "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler"). Armed with a MG34 and equipped with a German radio set, these vehicles were also equipped with cameras and sound recordings equipments.

During Summer 1943, several Panhard P178s were rearmed with a 5.0cm KwK L/42 gun installed in a superstructure unarmored to the rear. A few Panhard P178s were rearmed with a 5.0cm KwK L/60 gun but fitted with the muzzle brake from a Pak38.
Such a Panhard 178 with a 5.0cm KwK L/60 gun was captured and used in 1944-1945 by the 1st GMR (Groupement Mobile de Reconnaissance) of the FFI (French Forces of the Interior). This unit later called 'escadron autonome de chars Besnier' (Besnier independent tank squadron) is equipped in December 1944 with :

• 1x Panhard 178 with a standard 25mm gun
• 1x Panhard 178 with a 5.0cm L/60 gun
• 2x French Unic trucks fitted with a 81mm mortar
• 2x StuG III
• 1x Tiger I
• 1x Tiger II
• 1x Panther
• 11x Panzer IV
• 1x Jagdpanzer on French Lorraine chassis
• 1x Panzerwerfer 42
• 1x SdKfz-7 with a 20mm Flak
• 2x towing halftracks
• 1x workshop truck
• 4x lights trucks
• 4x heavy trucks

There was also a certain number of turret less command cars (maybe former French armored cars sent to the front in June 1940 without turret and only armed with a FM 24/29 or a MG behind a makeshift shield). There is a model with an aircraft modified turret armed with a MG81 which served for the protection of the Luftwaffe column 143. The Italians used also 2 Panhard P178s captured in November 1942 when the Germans seized Southern France, they could be found in the 224th coastal division.

In June 1943 the situation is grossly the following :
• Eastern Front Heeresgruppe A : 6 Renault B2 Heeresgruppe Süd : 12 Panhard P178 Heeresgruppe
  Mitte : 15 Hotchkiss H39, 2 Somua S35, 18 Panhard P178 Südosten (Balkans) : 96 Hotchkiss H39,
  43 Somua S35, 17 Renault B2
• Western Front 149 Hotchkiss H39 67 Somua S35 81 Renault B2 58 Renault R35
  12 Renault    FT17/18 33 Panhard P178
• Norway 68 Hotchkiss H39 17 Somua S35
• Finland (Panzer-Abteilung 211 + Panzerkampfwagen-Zug 217, 218 and 219) 33 Hotchkiss H39
  16 Somua S35

Germans had still about 700 French tanks in mid-1943 and still at the end of the war there were about 425 such tanks in the inventory. There were numerous Renault UE(f) (initially 3000 used), Lorraine tractors, Marder based on French chassis, softskins and halftracks etc.

The main conversions are:

• 200x 4.7cm Pak(t) auf PzKpfw R35 (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• 26x Befehlspanzer auf PzKpfw R35 (f)
• 170x Lorraine 37L converted to 7.5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw 37L (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• 24x 7.5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw 38H (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• 10x 7.5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw FCM (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
• 72x 7.5cm Pak40 auf Somua halftrack chassis
• 107x converted Lorraine tractors with 15cm (102), 10.5cm (24) or 12.2cm (r)
  (1 vehicle on an  armored train) howitzers and used as SP artillery in the PzDs before the arrival of
   the Wespe and Hummel SP howitzers.
• 48x FCM-36 converted with 10.5cm howitzers.
• beside the Lorraine and FCM conversions, there were also numerous Hotchkiss conversions and for
  example the 200. StuG Abt / 21. PzD in Normandy was equipped with 16x 7.5cm Pak40 auf
  Hotchkiss and 24x 10.5cm leFH18 auf Hotchkiss
• 18x B2 chassis with 10.5 cm howitzers
• 60x B2 tanks with flamethrower
  + other halftracks/tanks converted to SP AT gun, SP mortar(s), SP flamethrower, SP Flak or SP
   rocket-launchers 
 + halftracks converted to APCs like the leSPW U304(f) etc.

The 21.PzD in 1944 had over 50 different softskin types (mainly French) including Citroën, Laffly and Renault trucks. Unic P107 and Somua MCL and MCG halftracks as well as Somua SPWs were very common. In emergency situation the Germans always used their booty vehicles and proved to be skilled to convert and re-use all what they captured ... Even old 120mm Mle1878 De Bange French guns (!) were still used in some fortifications and by Rumanian troops in 1944. If they didn't used themselves some of these booty equipments they provided their allies (mainly Rumania, Bulgaria and Italy) with captured vehicles, guns, small arms or planes. All these captured equipments were necessary to the motorization of the German army of 1941.

About 100 7.5cm Pak40 auf Geschützwagen Lorraine "Marder I (SdKfz.135)" were still in service in 1943 :
• Units in the West using the Marder I during 1943 were : LVXXXIII. Korps Pz.Rgt. 100
1. PzD : 9 (already gone by 10.5.43, probably handed over to 26. Pz.Div., which kept them only for about 1 month) 44. ID : 9 (during summer 1943 exchanged for Marder III) 65. ID : 9 (during summer 1943 exchanged for Marder III) 76. ID : 9 (during summer 1943 exchanged for Marder III) 94. ID : 9 (during summer 1943 exchanged for Marder III) 113. ID : 9 (during summer 1943 exchanged for Marder III) 158. Reserve Division = 9 305. ID 343. ID 346. ID 348. ID 353. ID 384. ID 708. ID 709. ID 711. ID 712. ID 716. ID 719. ID
• Units in the East using the Marder I during 1943 were : 31. ID : 8 (4 on 31st December 1943) 35. ID : 8 (2 on 31st December 1943) 36. ID : 1 72. ID : 8 (4 on 31st December 1943) 206. ID : 8 (7 on 31st December 1943) 256. ID : 9 (7 on 31st December 1943)
384. ID : 14 (20th December 1943)

The French industries had also been mobilized by the German occupant :
• Berliet :
Various Berliet trucks were used by the German army (DGRA, GDC, GDM, VDCA etc.) and about 30 Berliet tank carriers were used by the Wehrmacht.
During 1943-1944 for example, 1262 trucks (5t) were produced for the German army.
• Bernard :
A few Bernard trucks (fuel tank trucks etc.) were used by the German army.
• Citroën :
Many booty cars, trucks and halftracks (Citroën Kégresse P14, P17, P19) were captured and used by the Germans. The Citroën-Kégresse P19 = Ci380(f) can for example be found in the Schnelle Brigade West. Many other vehicles were produced for the Germans between 1941 and 1944 like for example :
- 3700 type 23 trucks
- 6000 type 32U trucks
- 15300 type 45 trucks (the majority of the trucks of Schnelle Brigade West)
• Delahaye :
About 1000 SdKfz-11 were produced for the Germans (ordered in 1942).
The Delahaye factory also produced spare parts for the Büssing-NAG 4500.
• ELMAG (in Mulhouse, Alsace) :
Production of 1143 SdKfz-8 halftracks and spare parts for German halftracks between 1942 and 1944.
• Ford :
At the beginning of WW2, the French Ford factories located at Poissy and Asnières were controlled by the Laffly company. They transformed 1000 Ford trucks in half-tracked trucks (Maultier) and produced spare parts for the Ford trucks captured in Europe.
• Gnôme-Rhône :
Gnôme-Rhône in Gennevilliers (nowadays SNECMA) produced German engines for planes like the Henschel 129.
Gnôme-Rhône motorcycles and side-cars were also used by the Germans.
• Hotchkiss :
During the occupation, Hotchkiss produced spare parts, engines and several chassis for the Germans from 1940 to 1944 . Some Laffly vehicles (R15R, S20TL, W15T etc.) and several Hotchkiss personal cars (PKW Typ680, 686 and 686 PNA) were also produced for the Germans.
• Isobloc :
Numerous buses had been produced for the French army. Several W843M medical buses were used by the Germans. They could carry 30 lying wounded soldiers or a whole mobile chirurgical antenna.
• Laffly :
Many Laffly V15R, S15R, S20TL, W15T etc. were captured and used by the Germans.
A small number of armored SPW based on the W15T were produced for the Schnelle Brigade West.
In 1942, 60 Renault R-40 tanks were transformed for snow milling. 119 Renault R-40 were modified for the Luftwaffe (towing vehicles ?) and 200 various German tracked vehicles were also modified for the Luftwaffe by the Laffly factory. Laffly transformed also 22 wheeled and 33 tracked vehicles in snow ploughs.
• Latil :
Many Latil trucks and utility vehicles had been captured by the Wehrmacht. Some of the heavier trucks (Latil TAR H2) were again produced for the German forces.
• Lorraine :
Many Lorraine 37L and 38L were captured and used or modified by the Germans. The Lorraine factory also produced 500 SdKfz-9 in 1942.
• Matford (in Strasbourg, Alsace) :
Matford was born from the fusion between Ford and the French Mathis company. A few trucks were produced but mainly spare parts for the French booty Matford trucks like the Matford F917.

• Panhard; Levassor :
About 2000 Panhard trucks were delivered to the Germans army and about 1000 couples of tracks for the SdKfz-7 have been produced.
• Peugeot :
The factory is controlled by KDFWagen (future Volkswagen).
Many cars (Peugeot 202 and 402) and light trucks (Peugeot DMA, DK etc.) were captured and used but also produced. Between 1941 and 1944 Peugeot delivered to the Germans :
- 12500 Peugeot DK5
- 15300 Peugeot DMA
- about 15000 Peugeot 202 and 402
That make about 28000 trucks delivered to the Germans.
The factory produced also spare parts for the Kübelwagen and a few Volkswagen type 82 and 166 were completed. 150 SdKfz-10 per month were also planned to be produced in 1942 but the delivered number is unknown.
• Renault :
For Renault, most of the archives have disappeared during the allied bombings of 1944 but in François Vauvillier's book "l'automobile sous l'uniforme" it is indicated that about 28000 Renault trucks had been produced for the Germans during the occupation (AHS, AHN, AHR, AGC, ADK, ADH etc.). The Renault factories were administrated by Prinz Von Urach (who will later be the press attaché of Daimler-Benz after WW2). About 23000 Renault AHS trucks were used by the Germans (booty and new produced ones).
For example, from 1941 to 1944, 4000 Renault AHN and 2000 Renault AHR had been produced for the German army. In 1943, 704 AGC3 were deliverd.
Renault produced also spare parts for the SdKfz-7 and SdKfz-11.
• Saurer :
Several trucks were still produced for the Germans, especially the Saurer type 3CT which was liked. For example between 1943 and 1944 some 1800 3CT trucks were delivered to the Germans.
• Simca :
Simca produced personal cars for the German/Italian Army
1941/1942: 5983 Simca 5 (aka Fiat 500 Topolino) and 3960 Simca 8 (aka Fiat 1100)
1943: 122 Simca 8 and 19 Simca 5
1944: 180 Simca 8 and 23 Simca 5
Simca was intended to produce 2500 SdKfz-2 Kettenkraftrad but there seem not to have been produced. Tracks for the SdKfz-7, SdKfz-10 and SdKfz-11 were also produced.
• Somua :
Beside the Somua S-35 tanks, many MCL named S303(f) and MCG named S307(f) halftracks were captured. Many of these halfracks have been armored.
• Talbot :
From 1941 to 1944, Talbot produced tracks for the SdKfz-7, SdKfz-10 and SdKfz-11, braces for the Büssing-NAG S4500 and complete steering for the Panzer 38(t).
• Trippel :
The factory was located at Molsheim (Alsace) in the former Bugatti factory. They produced the Trippel SG6 amphibious car.
• Unic :
About 200 Unic TU1 U305(f) and 3000 Unic P107 U304(f) were used by the German army.
• Willeme :
A few Willeme type DU10 (10t) heavy trucks were used by the German army.
Beside the booty vehicles, the main companies (Renault, Peugeot, Citroën, Panhard, Berliet and Saurer ...) produced about 90,000 new trucks for the German army between 1941 and 1944. Especially for the Eastern front 200 French tanks were also converted to Mörserzugmittel / Artillerie-Schlepper / Bergeschlepper (tractors).

EXAMPLES OF UNITS ISSUED WITH FRENCH VEHICLES IN NORMANDY IN 1944 :

• 100. Panzer Abteilung (committed to 91. ID) Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731(f) Panzerkampfwagen 39H 735(f) Panzerkampfwagen 35S 739(f) Flammenwerferpanzer Renault B2 (f) Panzerkampfwagen 17R 730c(f)
• 21. Panzer Division Panzerkampfwagen 35S 739(f) Panzerkampfwagen 39H 735(f)
Flammenwerferpanzer Renault B1/B2 (f)
Panzerbeobachtungswagen auf 35/38/39H(f)
Großer Funk- & Beobachtungspanzer Lorraine-S (f) 10,5cm leFH18/40 auf
Geschützwagen 38H (f)
10,5cm leFH18 auf Geschützwagen Lorraine
15cm sFH13/1 auf Geschützwagen Lorraine
8cm Reihenwerfer auf SPW Somua S303/307 (f) 8cm Vielfachwerfer auf SPW Somua S303/307 (f)
7,5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw 38H (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
7,5cm Pak40 auf PzKpfw 39H (f) "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
7,5cm Pak40/1 auf Geschützwagen Lorraine "Marder I (SdKfz 135)"
7,5cm Pak40 (Sf) auf mSPW S307(f)
4,7cm Pak(t) auf PzKpfw 35R (f)
Zugkraftwagen P107 U304(f)
Zugkraftwagen Somua MCL S303 (f)
Zugkraftwagen Somua MCG S307(f)
leSPW U304(f)
leSPW U304(f) (Fkl)
leSPW U304(f) (FlaK 38)
leSPW U304(f) (PaK 36)
leSPW U304(f) (8cm GrW)
mSPW S303(f)
mSPW S303(f) (Pionier)
mSPW S307(f)
Softskins : over 50 different softskin types (mainly French, but also some Italian ones) including Citroën, Laffly and Renault trucks. Unic-Kégresse P107 and Somua MCL and MCG halftracks as well as Somua SPWs were very common.
• Artillerie Regiment of the 716. ID was equipped with : 8cm Reihenwerfer auf SPW Somua S303 (f) 8cm Vielfachwerfer auf SPW Somua S307 (f)
• Panzerjäger Abteilung of the 709. ID had nine 7,5cm Pak40 (Sf) auf mSPW S307(f)

Sources :

"The Panzers and the Battle of Normandy" (Georges Bernage)
"Normandy 1944 : German Military Organisation, Combat Power & Organizational Effectiveness" (Niklas Zetterling)
"L'automobile sous l'uniforme" (François Vauvillier)
"Captured French Tanks under the German Flag" by Werner Regenberg and Horst Scheibert (Schiffer)
"Captured Armored Cars and Vehicles in Wehrmacht Service in World War II" by Werner Regenberg (Schiffer)
"Captured Weapons and Equipment of the German Wehrmacht 1938-1945" by Wolfgang Fleischer (Schiffer)
" Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und -Panzer der deutschen Wehrmacht" by Walter J. Spielberger (Motorbuch Verlag)
"Trackstory n°1 : Somua S35"
"Trackstory n°2 : Panhard 178"
"Batailles & Blindés" magazine